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Israeli Special Forces Overview
The IDF and its SF are very different in almost every aspect from any other western counterparts. Due to the severity of the Israeli security situation over the years, all men and woman over 18 years old are obligated to serve a mandatory service in one of the Israeli security organizations. Man have to serve three years, while woman serve 18-21 month although the woman mandatory service is much more loosely enforced.

Naturally, most of the draftees will serve in the IDF, others will serve in the Israeli Police (mainly woman), the Israeli Border Guard (MAGAV), and even in clerical positions in the Israeli General Security Service (SHABACH), and in Israeli foreign intelligence gathering service - the renowned Mossad.

The selection for the IDF SF units is done at a very early stage. In most units it's conducted prior to the to the actual recruitment to the IDF, when the future soldiers are still teenagers in high school. In the rest of the units it's done during the basic infantry training stage.

Hence, unlike most SF units worldwide, there is no need whatsoever to a posses a prior military service in a conventional military unit in order to get into an IDF SF unit. Moreover, if one does not succeed in enrolling to one of the SF units before he begins his IDF service or during his first months of IDF service, he will probably never do. Therefore, a soldier can be an operator in a SF unit from his day one in the IDF and throughout his three years service up until the very day his service ends.

Moreover, while in most armies one move up the units, hence start his service in a regular unit or in a low level SF unit, and then move up to a more elite unit, in the IDF it’s exactly the other way around. Soldiers are assigned right from the start to the highest unit they could have achieved, and if the fail they will drop out to a lower status SF unit or even to a conventional infantry unit. There are few rare cases to the other direction, mainly involving outstanding officers that had moved up from regular infantry units to a commanding position in the SF unit.

In order to be accepted into most of the IDF SF units, one must first pass a selection phase, which is known as "Gibush". The Gibush lasts 3-5 days and focuses on physical stamina and the candidates' behavior under sleep depravation, fatigue, intense mental and physical pressure. There are also written exams and an interview with a psychologist, which usually take place at the end of the Gibush.

Few hundreds man start the Gibush for each such unit. Out of all them only 50-100 will see the Gibush through and the best 20-25 will be selected for the unit. In due time the selected personnel will join to the IDF together and form a one integral team.

Once the soldiers join the IDF they began a training regime (known as "Maslul") that in most IDF SF units lasts 20 months. Only on the conclusion of the entire Maslul are the soldiers qualified as warriors, receive their unit’s insignia and may engage in combat.

Unlike most foreign SF units, after the end of the Maslul the soldiers are not reassigned to other already operational teams in order to fill gaps, but rather will remain in the same one integral team from their recruitment date throughout their IDF service and until the end of service (which is usually at the same time as the end of the mandatory service).

Since all the soldiers in the team join the IDF at the same time, the IDF SF teams have a unique naming system. This system isn’t based on sequential letters or numbers like in other SF units around the world, but instead each team is referred by the team’s members drafting month and year. For example, "Sayeret Maglan August 99 team", refers to a team in Sayeret Maglan that was drafted in August 1999 and will finish its IDF service in august 2002, three years later. For a shorter call sign within the unit the teams are simply known by each team CO first name, i.e. "Daniel Team".

All personnel in the team have a homogeny military background. They are all in about the same age (18-21), and have the exact same military background, part for dropouts from other units that didn’t join the particular unit at the very beginning but rather at a later stage.

Since the IDF service is mandatory, during the first three years all soldiers including officers receive a symbolic fee of around 200$. Once the mandatory service ends if a soldier continue to serve, he will receive a more normal wage of around 2000$ in the first couple years. Due to this financial difference and the IDF low budget even SF troops rarely served more then the all IDF three years mandatory service.

This create a very non-efficient situation - since most IDF SF soldiers receive 20 months training they end up with just a little over a year to actually serve as combat soldiers. So, in some of the more elite units that enjoy more generous budgets, like Sayeret MATKAL, Shayetet 13 and the IAF SF units, the volunteers must sign an additional 1-2 years service period. However, in most units this additional signing period isn’t being enforced, and most soldiers serve only a fraction of it, if any. The only ones that serve for a long time after mandatory service are officers, hence there is no such thing as a 30 year old career NCO combatant in the IDF.

The situation in the Israeli civilian SF units is somewhat different and more resembles that of foreign units. In order to be accepted into most civilian SF units, one must first concludes his three years IDF service in a combat position. Further more, in order to apply one must have served in infantry or SF unit, or as a NCO in the Armor or in the Artillery corps. The future candidate must also pass a Gibush.

Since the operators are of heterorganic nature, with different serving time, on the conclusion of training the operators are divided among already operational teams according to need, and are allowed to stay on combat status until the age of 40, pending that the operator successfully passes the physical and tactical tests conducted several times a year.

Problems

The lack of one unified command for the IDF numerous SF units is the single most severe problem regarding the IDF SF, and one that is costing time, money and eventually lives for more then 50 years since the IDF was formed. The IDF simply has too many SF units, many of which have parallel or overlapping responsibilities with other units.

Without one outfit that supervises, coordinates and organizes these units, each IDF SF unit has its own training, weapons and gear arsenals and different command style. Moreover, the IDF SF units often receive too generous budgets at the expenses of the conventional infantry that does most of the actual daily combat deployment along Israel's hostile borders.

This is especially severe since the IDF is a large army - larger than the British, French or German armies.

Another problem is that due to prestige considerations, strategically important units such as PALSAR 7 and PALSAR 500 receive manpower leftovers, while the high quality draftees are channeled to the more sex appealing and high profile CT units, which have a minor wartime contribution to the IDF wartime effort.

Units Guide

Israeli Navy Special Forces Units

Shayetet 13 (S'13)

Shayetet 13 (S'13) is the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) elite Naval Commando unit. As a maritime unit, S'13 main advantage, over other land based Special Forces (SF) units, is the unit's inherent capability of its soldiers to arrive silently to the target via the sea, become an elite surface warriors and after the assault retreat independently through the sea without the need for an external extraction.

S'13 is one of the Israeli SF units that posses the longest history. S'13 history date even before the official declaration of the Israeli state and its army - the IDF - in 1948. The unit history can be divided into four time periods:

1939-1948 The Maritime resistance years prior to the deceleration of the state of Israel.

1948-1970 The Building Of The Unit.

1970-1980 The Reconstruction years.

1980- Reorganization.

1939-1948

Before the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948, Israel was under a British regime. The few Jews that were in Israel and the Arab citizens often fought each other over territorial and religious disputes. Since the British usually sided with the Arabs, the Jews created several underground armed resistance movements. The largest one of those resistance was the Hagana ("the Defense" in Hebrew). The Hagana main actions were against the Arabs but it also conducted minor sabotage missions against the British.

In 1939 when the World War Two (WW2) started, Jewish refugees start arriving from Europe to Israel. The British, who had enough trouble with the Jews already in Israel, didn't want any more of them, so they usually let the refugees' ships to stay over for one night and in the next day deport the Jews to another nearby country like Cyprus. In order to fight this Jews deportation, the Hagana began using maritime demolition sabotages in a desperate attempt to blow up the refugees' ships at night so the British would have no choice but to keep the Jews in Israel.

Until 1941, maritime demolition was conducted by the Hagana's Special Mission Unit (PUM). In 1941 the Hagana formed the 'Smash Companies' (PALMACH), which were the SF units of their time, and the PUM was integrated in them. The PALMACH also had a specialized maritime unit, which was in charged on the safe escorting of the refugee ships from Europe to Israel, rather then engaging in underwater sabotage missions.

In 1939-1945 the Hagana was torn over the question of what doctrine to use against the British. On the one hand, the UK fought the Germans Nazis and the Israeli Jews didn't want to undermined the British war effort by attacking military targets and soldiers. On the other hand, the Hagana naturally wanted to allow all fellow Jews escaping from Europe to find sanctuary in Israel. So, until 1945 when WW2 ended, the Hagana mainly focused on attacking Arab targets and sinking refugee ships, with little if any terror actions against pure British military targets.

In 1945, however, the internal debate in the Hagana ended due to a tragic incident - a ship of Jewish holocaust refugees that came from Germany to Israel was not allowed to enter into Israel's harbor and was turned back at gunpoint, ignoring the fact that the refugees on board were starving to death. As far as the Hagana was concerned this was the last straw. Since WW2 was already over, the Hagan decided to take off the gloves and in 1945 created the Sea Companies (PALYAM) with main goal of attacking both military and civilian British ships.

In the end of 1945 the PALYAM formed the Maritime Demolition Squad ("Haoulia") and began to attack British guard boats that were patrolling the harbors, preventing the refugees ships from entering. In 1945-1948 the Haoulia managed to perform several successful underwater demolition operations and were able to sink few British ships, even though the Haoulia members didn't have any diving gear and simply swam to their targets.

1948-1970

In 1948, the United Nations voted in favor of creating the new Jewish state and Israel was officially declared. With an official country, there was no longer need for underground movements, and all the Israeli resistance movements including the Hagana were merged together to form the IDF, and the Haoulia was placed under the new IDF IN command.

In 1949, the Haoulia was renamed and S'13 was created. In 1950, S'13 got its permanent Base (until this very day) - the Atlit Naval Base. Since there was a debate as to the need of such unit, it was relatively small and much under equipped. Nonetheless, the unit started a intense training program with foreign maritime SF units, mainly the French Commando Hubert and the British Special Boat Service (SBS).

In 1960, the unit was first made publicly known and S'13 operatives finally got their own distinctive insignia other then the general all IN insignia, they were wearing until then.

In 1965, the IN created a second SF unit - the Defensive Divers unit (Unit 707). This unit was composed out of dropouts from S'13 and was design to do defensive missions such as checking incoming vessels for mines and protecting harbors from enemy divers.

At the same time S'13 operations were one fiasco after another. The unit failed in executing even the simplest missions. Although even back then the unit training course was considered the physically hardest in the IDF, it was just that - physically hardest, not the most efficient or the most effective training. The solders graduated with amazing physical stamina but their combat skills were lacking.

S'13 main problem was discipline. The solders simply did anything they wanted to, behaving like they are still in the PALMACH time rather then in a full fledged army.

In 1967, the Israeli-Arab Six Day war started. The IN, confident in the ability of S'13, based most its operations on the unit. This was a big mistake. While the rest of the IDF did a perfect classic blitzkrieg (high speed attacks), S'13 managed to flank all its operations.

In May 6 1967 during a covert operation six operatives even managed to get themselves captured and were taken as Prisoners Of War (POW). S'13 POW were released more then six months later in January 1968. S'13 failures were especially severe because the unit had years to train and prepare, not to mention that S'13 could had learned from the experience of the foreign units that it had joint training with. But S'13 in a typical Israeli arrogance decided they would learn everything by themselves. As result - out of the about 70 casualties S'13 had to this very day, most of them were in ridiculous training accidents that all of them could have been very easily avoided if basic safety rules were maintained and practiced.

The situation was so bad that other SF units used to say that S'13 did a better job killing its own personnel then it did in killing enemy solders, which was not far from the truth. The only thing that prevented S'13 from becoming the laughing stock of the entire IDF was the fact that they were a top secret classified unit. Very few people out side the unit knew about it, let alone their operations. At the time S'13 found the secrecy screen very convenient since it didn't really had nothing to show for, especially in a war in which conventional units, not to mention other SF units, performed flawlessly. The secrecy screen also managed to keep S'13 unjust reputation as the second best unit in the IDF after Sayeret MATKAL (Unit 262) - the IDF elite primary SF unit.

1970-1980

In 1970, S'13 was a non existent unit, after three members of the unit were killed and 10 more were badly injured in the Green Island raid in 1969. Since at the time the entire unit was composed of about 20 warriors there was a need to completely rebuild the unit. Quite ironically, this was the best thing that ever happened to S'13. After some of the "hot air" got out, the unit started integrating sea-to-land incursions in order to become a raids unit and began to finally train seriously.

Of course things didn't go smoothly. The other IDF SF units were strongly against S'13 becoming a surface raids unit and claimed that S'13 should only act as "water taxis" providing the transportation to the target and helping them to go over water obstacles, while leaving the surface warfare to the "land" IDF SF units. The strongest opposition to S'13's new role as a raids unit came from Sayeret MATKAL. Sayeret MATKAL commander at that time, Menachem Diglly, had a grudge against S'13 ever since he was only the second in command (after S'13 commander Zehev Almog) in the Green Island attack in 1969, and especially since after this operation S'13's operatives excused Sayeret MATKAL soldiers in bad combat performance. The truth was somewhere in the middle. The rest of IDF SF units simply didn't want another competitor.

In the late 1960's and especially in early 1970's both S'13 and Sayeret MATKAL suffered from the Israeli SF symptom known as "forget my original job description, I want to be a big elite SF unit that will master everything". So S'13 wanted to turn from an underwater demolition unit to sea-to-land incursions unit (much like today's U.S. Navy SEALs and other similar units), and Sayeret MATKAL turned from an intelligence gathering unit to a SF unit in charge on taking out strategically importance targets far behind enemy lines. both units were used to perform covert missions in very small teams and didn't had the advanced open field combat skills possessed by long time raids units like Sayeret Golany and Sayeret T'zanhanim (paratroopers). S'13 and Sayeret MATKAL considering themselves as elite units also were very picky on what missions they perform, and wanted to do only the high profile national security operations and not just "regular" ambushes and "every day" raids. since this kind of missions are rare by nature Sayeret MATKAL, S'13 and Sayeret T'zanhanim find themselves fighting each other to receive the assignments.

another problem was that back then the elite units were very small (only 25-30 warriors each) and therefore were often Forced against their will to cooperate with each other in large scale operations (like the Green Island attack). Even when it was technically possible to conquer the target using only one SF unit, often the IDF send in two units to do the job because of the fighting between the units commanders on which unit perform the operation. the generals simply took the easy solution and send both units in instead of arguing with the units' commanders. But the IDF learned a valuable lesson from the Green Island attack: it is best to send only one unit to one target. Combining two Israeli SF units as one big internal joint force simply doesn't work. Different training and command styles lead to non-fluent fighting causing unnecessary casualties. Even when there is a multiple target operation, you can send in few units but each one will take only one target.

For example, in the famous Spring Of Youth operation in 1973, four units participated: Unit 707, S'13, Sayeret MATKAL and Sayeret T'zanhanim. each unit attacked a different target independently and successfully. Unfortunately these important lessons were forgotten in the Blue And Brown operation in 1988. in this operation three units were involved: Unit 7142 (the IDF SF dogs unit), Sayeret Golany and S'13. the three units attack the same targets simultaneously and the operation failed dramatically with Sayeret Golany commander Amir Meital killed. when Ehoud Barak (today the Israeli prime minister) was appointed as Sayeret MATKAL commander in 1972, some of the tension between Sayeret MATKAL and S'13 disappeared. Barak, one of the best Israeli SF professionals ever, recognized the potential of S'13 and pushed for joint missions resulting in missions like operation Spring Of Youth in 1973. Besides this, the elite civilian CT unit YAMAM was created in 1974 and Sayeret MATKAL had another competitor to worry about. Not only had S'13 experienced problems with other SF units but it had problems even within the navy itself - Unit 707.

In 1969, after seeing S'13 fiascoes during the 1960's, Unit 707 decided it could be more than just a "defensive divers" unit. Unit 707 started undergoing a demolition course and began executing offensive rather then defensive missions. in 1970 Unit707 start wearing an insignia of its own. The unit even start independently recruiting of personnel and stop just settling for S'13 dropouts. In 1971, all of Unit 707's warriors took on a parachuting course and the unit was officially declared as a "raids" units. With its new qualifications, Unit 707 began performing missions that originally belong to S'13, causing a lot of tension and rivalry between the two units.

the high ranking officers in the IN found Unit 707 existence very convenient since S'13, after several successful operations in the early 70's, had become very picky on what missions it performed. Unit 707, however, was more then ready to perform any kind of operation from civilian maritime Search And Rescue (SAR) operations to actual combat raids. The IN high ranking officers, who did not see the need for a dedicated maritime SF unit in the first place, enjoyed the struggle between the two units and thought that this competition would be productive. Actually, it was ultimately destructive. Operational lessons and experience weren't transferred from one unit to another plus the units were fighting over the same limited budget.

S'13 operators were personally offended with Unit 707. Unit 707 was made out dropouts from S'13 and therefore supposedly "inferior" to them, but Unit 707's operatives were doing all the missions as well as S'13 warriors and some times even better. also, unlike the dozen of deadly training and diving accidents in S'13, Unit 707 didn't had one fatal accident. the tension between the unit reach its peak in 1972 when former S'13's second in command, Dov Bar, had become the new Unit 707 commander. Bar had declared that Unit 707 would no longer accept dropouts from S'13, but from now on all new personal would be fresh recruits.

After the Yom Kippur war in 1973 the IN commander decided that he had just about enough of the petty rivalry between Unit 707 and S'13. It was simply not wise economically or operationally to keep two SF units with almost the same missions and qualifications. in 1974 one commander was appointed for the two units and in 1975 all Unit 707's operators went through a short advanced training course, switched their insignia with the S'13 insignia and become S'13 warriors. The two units merged completely. Most of S'13 successful operations in the 70's were during the Israel-Egypt War of Attrition (1968-1973). More then a "war", this was actually a brutal Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) mainly involving SF units from both sides. During the Attrition war S'13 finally managed to pull some successful operations and regained its lost pride.

In 1973, when the Yom Kippur war (a.k.a. the October war) broke, however, S'13 lost of some its pride again. On the one hand S'13 had successful diving operations resulting in the sinking of Egyptian ships, and on the other hand embarrassing failed surface raids. in fact, in the Yom Kippur war S'13 found itself in the same situation as SM. after S'13's fiascoes in the Six Day war in 1967, the IN didn't include S'13 in its wartime operations, and S'13 needed to chase mission independently. because of the high motivation from S'13's high ranking officers to reprove themselves, they push the unit to perform more and more missions during the war. the solders were dead tired and were forced to do near suicide missions which they were not ready for and weren't really important to the overall Israeli war effort. the main problem was that S'13 didn't decided if it was an underwater demolition unit or raids units and tried to be both. as result the unit did not excel in either of the two types of missions.

Another problem was that in the 1970's the main training assumption was that S'13 operative should know and master any type of maritime warfare. So all the warriors were thought both advance diving and boats usage in their training. As it is impossible to teach someone to be the best in everything the solders really weren't good in any of the subjects, they just learned a little bit of each subject and then moved on to the next. As a result, after finishing their training regime, when the soldiers were reassigned to the diving or boats companies, they were simply average quality warriors and needed to be retrained yet again. Since most of this retraining was "on the job training" the operatives never become more then average fighters.

Another problem was that back then in the 70's, the entire S'13 training period was held with the IN itself. S'13 operatives didn't participated in the IDF courses but did everything within the unit. So when S'13 had perform missions with other units there were serious communications problems. most of the officers didn't do the IDF six months infantry officers course but rather a short version of the naval officers course. the biggest problem was that after 1973 and until 1980 S'13 high ranking officers were too busy in political fights with each other to do anything about the S'13's pathetic combat capable statues, and the unit barely performed any more operations until 1980.

1980-

In 1979 Amy Ayalon, today the head of the SHABACH (Israel's internal general security service), was appointed as the new S'13 commander. Ayalon that serve in other roles in the IN and was absent from S'13 for three years, was not involved in the inner unit political struggles that were tearing S'13 combat capabilities apart. when he got the command he "cleaned house" and made a big organizational change in S'13. this change lead to the S'13 we know it today - compose of three Palgot - raids, divers and boats (instead of only the two Palgot that existed until then - divers and boats).

Ayalon also made important changes in the unit 20 months training regime (known as Maslul): the Maslul was divided into three parts- preparing phase, diving phase and advanced phase. Moving the diving course to the middle of the Maslul made the preparing stage the main selection phase avoiding dropouts in the more important diving phase. also the reassignments to the difference Palgot as well as each Palga unique training begins in the advanced stage so the solder finished the Maslul as trained professional with one major field of expertise and a good solid background in all aspect of maritime and land surface warfare.

Another important change was that, from then on, the first six months of the Maslul would be devoted to basic and advanced infantry combat that will be thought in the same way that is being thought in the entire IDF, so all of the SF units would "speak the same language" in future joint operations. Ayalon even forced all officers to take the all IDF infantry officers course and only then do advanced naval course within the IN. in 1980 the unit was already after the organizational change. now the unit was bigger, stronger and eager to show its talent. in the early 80's with the increased Israeli involvement in Lebanon the unit got plenty of chances to show its stuff. in the 80's S'13 finally earned its reputation as the second best elite unit in the IDF. S'13 conduct dozens of successfully operations each year, with zero Israeli casualties. during the Israeli invasion to Lebanon in 1982 S'13 helped pin-pointing the IN ships' missiles and gun fire to the targets on the beach. This winning streak lasted until 1997 when a team from the 'raids' Palga fell right into terrorist ambush in Lebanon, and during the fight 12 S'13 team members were killed.

In the late 1980's and in the 1990's the IDF realized that it wasn't exploiting the full potential of the talents found in S'13. Most of S'13 graduates simply finished their 4.5 years of service in the unit and left to the civilian life with their valuable experience and expertise lost. so the IDF decided to blend S'13 officers in the other SF units. this was especially done in newly born special missions units that the IDF wanted to quickly bring to operational and combat ready status. for example the IDF Mistaravim units, born in 1987 (Sayeret Duvdevan and Sayeret Shimshon) and the IDF counter guerrilla unit (Egoz) born in 1995 (the current commander of S'13 was the first commander of Egoz). due to the know how of S'13 officers those units gain fearsome Counter Terrorism (CT) capability and used it to become highly successful units with excellent combat record.

Inner Organization

S'13 is divided into three companies known as Palgot. Each Palga has a special role which it masters:

The Raids Palga ("Haposhtim")

This Palga contains the best soldiers in S'13, in charge on assassinations, incursions and CT. Like Sayeret MATKAL and it's unit -269 - S'13 also has a special CT team within the unit. This team is designated as Team 4 (T4) and belongs to the Raids Palga. Both T4 and Sayeret MATKAL Unit 269 represent the cutting edge in warriors, training and equipment of their "mother" units (much like Navy SEALs and the Development Group - DEVGRU, in the U.S.).

The 'Underwater' Palga ("Hat'zolelim"- the divers)

This Palga is in charge on all the underwater missions such hydrographic reconnaissance (surveying beach before landing) and underwater demolition against enemy ships and harbors. The Underwater Palga often works in cooperation with the other to palgot either supporting the Raids Palga operations such as securing the beaches before landing or conducting its own operations.

The 'Above Water' Palga

Specialize in the operation of S'13 boats (Zaharon, Snunit, Moulit and Morena) and in cooperation's with the IN ships and Submarines. Their main mission is to bring the 'Divers' and the 'Raids' Palgots safely and accurately to the targets. In many ways the above water Palga resembles the U.S. Special Boat Units (SBU). But unlike the SBU which is a separate outfit from the U.S. Navy SEALs, the above water Palga is an integral part of S'13 and its operators are full fledged S'13 warriors.

Out of the three companies, the biggest one is the Raids Palga follows by the Underwater Palga and the Above Water Palga.

Each warrior in S'13 serves a minimum of 4.5 years - three years of mandatory service (like all the other men in the IDF) and 1.5 years of non-mandatory service which the solders must sign as one of the basic demands for applying to the unit.

Exceptions

Over the years S'13 had distinguished itself in several aspects comparing to other Israeli SF units and especially comparing to the Israeli's most elite SF unit - Sayeret MATKAL.

Training

S'13 training course lasts one year and eight months (like in most other IDF SF units) and is considered to be the hardest one in Israel (both comparing to the IDF SF units and to the Israeli civilian special units). this extreme training regime is the main reason for the big dropout rate in S'13 (mostly because of injuries) that brought S'13 to embrace a different selection method.

Selection

Most Israeli SF units begin their training course with one 20-25 man team and in the end of training course the team contains 10-12 man. S'13, however, begin its training with 80-100 men and ended it with small team of 10-12 man. this different selection system is mainly done because of large amount of injuries in S'13 rigorous training regime (especially due to the maritime environment and diving hazards), and also allowing S'13 to have much more freedom in hand picking the very best out of the new recruits. ironically, since S'13 needs to start its training with larger number of man then any other SF unit, the Gibush (a four day selection phase prior to acceptance into the unit) is relatively easy, with 30-40 percent passing out of the man who started the Gibush. in most other SF units the main focus in the Gibush is team work. in S'13 Gibush, however, a big emphasis is placed on the ability to perform alone under pressure, because when the soldier is diving underwater he is his own commander without anyone else for guidance or emotional support.

Life after the unit

Most of Sayeret MATKAL graduates usually use their service in the Sayeret MATKAL as a starting point to a military career or to civilian life. many Sayeret MATKAL graduates storm their way in the IDF all the way to the general staff (the IDF high command- a.k.a. "MATKAL", hence the name Sayeret "MATKAL") and later to key position in the civilian political life (for example Ehoud Barak currently Israel Prime Minster- former Sayeret MATKAL commander and Benjamin Netanyahu former Israel prime minister- former captain in Sayeret MATKAL). Sayeret MATKAL graduates thinking they are above everybody else also rarely joined Israel security services - the SHABACH (Israel domestic general security service) and the Mossad (Israel foreign intelligence service). S'13 graduates, however, usually finished their military service in the unit itself and rarely left it to serve elsewhere. Even if they did, it usually was within the IN. Until this day the IDF had four IN commanders that were former S'13 Commanding Officers (CO) - Yohay Ben Nun, Zehev Almog, Amy Ayalon and Yedida Yahary.

Used to working in the silence and performing covert classified missions many S'13 graduates found their way into Israel security organizations. for example, most of the personal in the Mossad's operational "direct action" units are former S'13 operatives (especially from T4). the same goes for the SHABACH (especially since Amy Ayalon, former S'13 commander, was appointed as the head of the SHABACH in 1996). many S'13 members also joined Israel's elite civilian units - the YAMAM (belong to the border guard - MAGAV) and unit Gideonim (belong to the Israeli police - IP).

Joint Training

Unlike the first four decades of the IDF, in the 1990's IDF SF units rarely train with foreign units. There is simply no need. After more then five decades of continuous fighting, Israeli SF units are by far the most experienced combat units in the world, and have very little to learn from other foreign units. most of the training that do exist are not directly between the foreign units and the Israeli SF units but rather between Unit 707 (the IDF CT school) and the foreign units. this enable the entire knowledge gained in this joint training experience to be gathered and pass through the entire Israeli SF community rather then stay in just one unit.

S'13 is the one exception. Because of the complication and specialty involved in maritime training, it is impossible to conduct maritime training with Unit 707, so it is done directly with S'13 and the foreign unit. Also, even if it was technically possible to make such training with Unit 707, it would be a waste of resources since this training is only relevant to S'13 and S'13 alone, so there is not much sense in involving the entire IDF CT school.

In the 50's and in the 60's most of the joint training were conducted with the French Commando Hubert (in 1957 an S'13 operative even died in France during combat diving exercise) and today most of the training is with the US Navy SEALs. not only does S'13 do direct joint training with foreign units, but there are also the longest. while Unit 707 joint training barely last days, S'13 joint training usually takes weeks and some times even months, with training done either in Israel with the help of the US Sixth Fleet ships and submarines (the Six Fleet home base is the Haifa Israeli Naval Base) or in the US.

Weapons

S'13 is currently the only unit that employed the Russian AK47 assault rifle as a standard issue weapon for its operatives. all other Israeli SF units use the CAR15 (the carbine version of the M16A1).

Missions

Over the years S'13 had performed over 1,000 missions - most of them highly classified. The large number of missions reflects one of the main differences between Sayeret MATKAL and S'13. Sayeret MATKAL works in the "projects" method, which means it perform 2-3 missions a year with long months of preparations before each one. S'13 however perform dozens of missions a year, most of them on the south Lebanon front. S'13 missions are surgical and selective - destroying terrorist boats, blowing up enemy headquarters (often with limpet mines- a powerful anti ship mine which has devastating effect once attached to the side of building), ambushes and planting explosives in terrorist routes. S'13 usually operates deep behind the Lebanese lines, which is by itself an act of war. Since each mistake may have international consequences the chosen unit must the best one for the job- S'13.

Time of service and reserve forces

In most other SF units, once the solders finish their three year mandatory service, they are leaving the military service. A small number of them will serve in the unit reserve force, but the rest will serve as reserve solders in other units, usually in Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) units belong to reserve infantry brigades. Sayeret MATKAL and S'13 are different. not only are the solders required to sign more time after the mandatory service (six months more in Sayeret MATKAL and 1.5 years more in S'13) but most of them will serve in the reserve forces of the unit. Because of budgetary reasons most SF and "regular" units are not allowed to sign Non commissioned Officers (NCO) for extra non mandatory period (mandatory solders receive a symbolic wage of around US$150-200, while non-mandatory solders receive a "normal" civilian wage of around US$ 1,500-1,700)

Training

Like most other IDF SF units the entire training course of S'13 lasts 20 months, and is consider to be the most physically and mentally demanding training regime in the in the IDF. only after finishing the entire 20 months training period the solders are qualified as warriors and begin to participate in actual combat.

The training phase is made off:

Four months basic infantry training in the Mitkan Adam army base, the IDF special forces training facility.

Two and half months of advanced infantry training held in the IDF infantry school (BISLASH) in south of Israel.

Three weeks high altitude low opening (HALO) and high altitude high opening (HAHO) course at the IDF parachuting school (.a.k.a. MARA) near the Tel Nof Air Force Base (AFB).

These three phases are relatively easy and usually there aren't any dropouts at this time. These phases are in a regular infantry difficulty level and are meant to build combat fitness and basic infantry skills. After finishing of the parachuting course the solders are reassigned to the S'13 home Base- Atlit Naval Base, switch their personal weapons from M16 to AK47 and start training in S'13's extreme standards.

"The Preparing" ("Hamachin") - The next phase is in the Atlit Naval Base and is known as "The Preparing" ("Hamachin") stage. This phase lasts seven months and is called "The Preparing" because it is the stage in which most of the solders dropout (usually after around two months - some voluntarily and some are told to). This stage prepares the soldiers to their diving course and underwater combat training which are the next steps. This phase is also the main selection phase, soldiers who will finished it will usually finish their entire training in S'13 and will be qualified as S'13 warriors (unless of course they are physically injured - a common reason for dropping out of S'13).

If a solder finishes the preparing stage and later turned out to be only an average warrior (by S'13's standards) he usually will finish the entire training period and reassigned to the above water Palga. it's simply uneconomic to dropout a soldier after his been invested with over a year of very expensive training. The "preparing" phase is composed of advanced infantry and weapons training, the basic elements of maritime warfare, seaman shipping - operation of small ships, long swims and marches and land demolitions. Also included in this phase are six weeks CT training - three weeks in IDF CT school located in the Mitkan Adam army base, and three more weeks inside the unit.

Basic combat diving course - This lasts about a month. During this phase the soldiers learn the basic elements of combat diving. how to face cold, diving in dark and clouded water, and how to survive dangerous underwater situations (rocks, curves, pressure, depth). all the diving is been done in pairs with the two operatives tied to each other so one can easily notify the other of a problem.

Advanced Phase - During this phase the solders learn advance diving techniques (with oxygen recycling system to avoid bubbles and to extend the diving period), underwater demolitions and weapons and long months of practicing sea-to-land incursions (with diving, ships, Submarines and parachuting into sea). then the solders learned how to combine all there knowledge to perform maritime CT operations (on ships, oil rigs and near coast buildings). In the middle of this phase the solders are divided according to the three S'13 Palgot- the best go to the 'raids' Palga ("Haposhtim"), the second best are reassigned to the 'underwater' Palga ("the Divers"), and the third best are assigned to the 'above water' Palga. From that moment on each group of solders will train separately according to their Palga's specialty: the raids Palga will master assignations, ambushes, sea incursions, CT and all types of land warfare.

The underwater Palga will focus on intensive combat diving exercises, underwater demolition and underwater warfare as well operating the mini submarines (minisubs). The above water Palga will master maritime navigation and the operating of S'13's three main kinds of Fast Attack Boats (FAB) - Zaharon, Snunit and Moulit. After finishing this 20 months of intense training the solders receive their bat wings insignia, and are qualified as warriors that can now engage in actual combat.

Weapons

The standard personal issue weapon in the Israeli SF units is a modified version of the CAR15, often with M203 grenade launcher for increased firepower. As one of the results of the massive reorganization in the IDF CT units (caused by the Mahalot fiasco in 1974 in which more then 20 children were killed in failed Sayeret MATKAL hostage rescue raid), and several deadly identity mistakes, the IDF stopped using Soviet weapons (Arab-issued) and adopted the M16 family as the standard weapon. S'13, however, is currently the only unit in the entire IDF that uses the Soviet AK47 on a daily basis.

There are several reasons why S'13 chose the AK47 as its main personal issue weapon. During the 70's the IDF SF units used a variety of assault rifles of different calibers: AK47 7.62 mm, Israeli Military Industries (IMI) Galil AR (Assault Rifle) 5.56 mm, FN FAL 7.62 mm and the American rifles M16 5.56 mm and M14 7.62 mm (the American rifles arrived during the American airborne aid to Israel in the Yom Kippur war). In a series of tests conducted by S'13, it found out that the best weapons for maritime missions were the IMI Galil AR and the AK47, at least when it came down to water and sand resistance.

But the AK47 had one major advantage over the Galil - it was the 'number one' weapon among terrorists and carrying it gave S'13 operators a few seconds before the terrorists could be sure if the person in front of them was enemy or friend (the same line of thought that guided the US MACV-SOG unit during the Vietnam war, often performing missions in typical north-Vietnamese clothing and carry AK47). This was especially correct since in the 80's, when S'13 performed many missions for the SHABACH, both in Lebanon and in the Occupied Territories often dressed in typical Arab clothing (Mistaravim type missions). Since unlike most operations conduct by other SF units, S'13 operations in Lebanon are deep into Syrian-Lebanese held territory, S'13 found it convenient to use AK47 which are deniable weapons.

For the same reason, S'13 rarely gets credit for its operations in the media. most of this operations are never revealed to the media and to the public and are often describe as "terrorist clashes" in south Lebanon. since the Arabs terrorists in Lebanon are not exactly eager to admit they lose some of their comrades without a single enemy lost, they often keep the Israeli raids to themselves. in many cases the terrorists actually think that the raid was conducted by a rival terrorists fraction. using the standard terrorist issue AK47 help to support this thought. In the early 1990's with the CAR15 becoming the standard personal issue weapons in the IDF SF community, S'13 increased the use in the CAR15 especially when it wanted to carry grenade launchers for increased fire power (the AK47 can also be fitted with 40 mm grenade launcher but it's much less accurate then the M203 mounted on M16).

Over the years the AK47 become almost a myth in S'13 and their main recognition feature. Today the AK47 is being carried by the young soldiers throughout their training period in the Atlit Naval Base (after finishing training the solders receive 9mm handguns, usually SIG Sauer P226). The AK47 are only carried today in missions that involve diving. In other missions such as raids, which are the majority of operations performed by S'13 in peacetime, the warriors carry M16 CAR15 which is much lighter, more versatile and more accurate weapon then the AK47. Also, the M16 CAR15 carry the same type of ammunition (5.56 mm SS109/M855) as fired by the IMI Negev light Machine Gun (LMG) which is today the standard LMG in the IDF (the Negev replaced the old FN MAG 7.62 mm LMG that were ere in service in the IDF). SF units like S'13 have a special short barrel version of the Negev with only 330 mm barrel (the regular version has 460 mm barrel). Another reason for S'13 to minimize the usage in the AK47 is that there is simply no need any more to use it.

Today most of the undercover SHABACH missions are given to the Unit YAMAM which has unparalleled Close Quarters Combat (CQB) skills. the SHABACH "discovered" the YAMAM during the Intifada (the Palestinian uprising in late 80's) and transfer all of the delicate covert missions from S'13 to the YAMAM. Also, with so much high-tech equipment, bullet proof vests and communication gear carried by S'13 operatives, a terrorist should be blind to mistakenly identify S'13 operator as fellow terrorist. Carrying M16 CAR15 also prevent deadly identity mistake in joint operation with other SF units that in the hit of combat may consider anyone with AK47 as enemy.

Another favorite weapon among S'13 operatives is the IMI 9 mm Micro Uzi Sub Machine Gun (SMG). the Uzi SMG family is hardly used in the IDF. The only Uzi variant still used by the IDF is the Micro Uzi which the newest and the smallest version in the Uzi family. S'13, however, always found the Micro Uzi perfectly matching its needs. Because of its small size, weight and its folding stock the Micro can be very easily strapped to a soldier leg or fit nicely in his combat vest, and therefore able the soldier to dive or swim without the interference created by the bigger assault rifles. Due to financial as well as political reasons, Israel is the only western nation in the world whose SF units don't use the Heckler and Koch (HK) MP5 family.

S'13 adopted the Micro Uzi (usually carried with Sionics type sound suppresser) as its main weapon in maritime CT operations involving diving, and as a standard silenced weapon for the point man in surface operations. In the never ending search to find a compact yet maritime environment (sea, sand and salt water) proof weapon, S'13 also recently tested the newest version of the IMI Galil rifles family - the Galil 5.56 Micro Assault Rifle (MAR) a.k.a. the Micro Galil. during testing the Galil MAR showed all advantages and the disadvantages of the entire Galil family. On the one hand, it possessed amazing rough handling capability. On the other hand, low accuracy, high weight (both the weapon itself and its magazines) and low versatility (the Galil MAR isn't equipped to carry modern optics and aiming accessories and devices, and an expert gunsmith help is required in order to do so).

In the Galil MAR case, with only 195 mm barrel, the Galil family known accuracy problem is especially severe, making the weapon unfit for hostage rescue mission, but this can be solve by using barrel extended modern compensators. the Galil MAR has another very serious problem- due to a failure in its handguards heat absorbing mechanism, the Galil MAR's handguards get so warm after rapid single firing of only 3-4 magazines in a role, it's painful to hold the weapon. If fired in the auto mode it takes only two magazines to get the same effect. This was the main reason why the Galil MAR failed in the test and S'13 remained with the AK47 as the primary weapon in the unit's maritime operations.

While the Galil MAR is inferior in almost every way (expect for rough handling) to the M16 CAR15 Commando version (the extreme short barrel of the CAR15 carbine with only 11.5 inch barrel instead of the regular 14.5 inch CAR15's barrel), the Galil MAR is big leap forward comparing to the 1940's design of the AK47: the Galil MAR is much more lighter then the AK47 (the Galil MAR weight only 3.7 kg with full loaded magazine), shorter (only 707 mm with the stock in a full ready open position), the Galil MAR's 5.56 mm caliber, comparing to the AK47's short 7.62 mm caliber, enable not only carrying many more rounds while maintaining the same weight, but it allows interchangeability with the 5.56 mm ammunition (SS109/M855) fired by the CAR15 and the IMI Negev LMG which are also carried in most missions, especially since the Negev can use the Galil's or the M16 CAR15's magazines but not the AK47's magazines because of the different caliber.

Also, like HK MP5 family the Galil MAR can also be fitted with tactical forearm (usually containing flashlight or laser sight). with the Galil family originally based on the AK47 design, the basic operating system of the Galil MAR (safety, magazines insertion, dissembling, etc.) is very similar to that of the AK 47, so it's very easy to a S'13 member, used to firing the AK47, to switch to the Galil MAR. So in the case that the Galil MAR's handguards heating problem will be solved, the Mar is very likely to be S'13 future weapon replacing the mythical AK47.

Unit YALTAM ("Yechida Lemesimot Tat-Memyot", in Hebrew)

As its name suggest, the Israeli Navy Underwater Missions Unit ("Yechida Lemesimot Tat-Memiyot - YALTAM", in Hebrew) is in charge on complex underwater assignments.

These missions include:

Search And Rescue (SAR) and the retrieval of submerged ships and airplanes.

Various underwater construction, such as welding and explosions.

The unit also posses strong Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) ability, allowing it to explode or disarm devices such as old mines and other detonating weapons.

During wartime the unit will perform preemptive dives in Israeli harbors in order to prevent enemy divers’ incursions.

While primarily a mission of Unit YABAN, the Israeli Navy Harbor Security Unit, in Unit YALTAM’s home base – The Haifa Harbor – Unit YALTAM will also assist in diving tests for incoming vessels, including both military and civilian ones, to make sure there are no underwater mines attached.

Largely differs from other Israeli Defense Force (IDF) Special Forces (SF) units, Unit YALTAM is not only a totally defensive unit by nature, but it’s also very small and made almost entirely from non-mandatory personal. Most of Unit YALTAM personal did its three years IDF mandatory service in Unit YABAN. The rest are from Shayetet 13 (S’13) - the IDF elite Naval Commando unit.

Till today, the unit had only one casualty - Corporal Yuval Levy - during a diving accident, February 18, 1998. Yuval dived along with another Unit YALTAM diver to check out an incoming vessel for underwater mines. According to the procedure the ship's crew was not to engage the ship's engines until the end of Unit YALTAM security check. However, for some unclear reason one of the ship's crew members activated the ships engines, one of the propellers hit Yuval and he was killed on the spot. The second diver that was co-diving with Yuval instantly reported the incident, yet it took three more hours and 30 divers to recover Yuval's body due to the low visibility and muddy Haifa harbor's waters.

Since all the personal arriving to the unit already posses extensive and intense combat diving experience, Unit YALTAM training are short and is mainly focused on very deep diving and specialized underwater activation of SAR and construction tools, such as robots, torches, metal detectors and of various electronic equipment.

As mentioned above, the unit home base is in the Haifa harbor, a very logical location since it’s the Israeli Navy biggest base. Elements from the unit will also deploy to other naval bases according to need.

Unit YABAN ("Yechida Lebitahon Nemalyim", in Hebrew)

Land Corps Special Forces Units

Introduction

Part from Sayeret MATKAL and Shayetet 13, the IDF infantry Sayerets are the most famous Israeli SF units, and represent the classic model of an IDF SF unit - a hard core LRRP unit with advanced CT and hostage rescue capabilities.

The IDF have four regular infantry brigades that form the IDF Infantry Corps, each with its own distinctive head gear color:

Golany infantry brigade

Givaty infantry brigade

NAHAL infantry brigade

T'zanhanim (Paratroopers) infantry brigade

The four brigades are in theory identical and share the exact same inner organization. Each infantry brigade is made of three conventional infantry battalions and four special brigade level units:

Reconnaissance Company ("Plugat Siur - PALSAR", in Hebrew).

Anti Tank Company ("Plugat Neged Tankim - PALNAT", in Hebrew).

Engineering Company ("Plugat Heil Handasa - PALHAN", in Hebrew).

Signal Company ("Plugat Heil Kesher - PALHICK", in Hebrew).

Out of the above four brigade level units, the only one which is considered as a SF unit is the PALSAR. The other three companies are high quality specialized infantry units, with better manpower and gear then the conventional battalions, but they are not SF. Accordingly, the IDF four infantry Sayerets are:

Sayeret Golany (PALSAR 95), based in the Shrga army base.

Sayeret Givaty (PALSAR 8234), based in Mishmar HaNegev army base.

Sayeret NAHAL (PALSAR 374), based in the Beit Lead army base.

Sayeret T'zanhanim (PALSAR 5173), based in the Beit Lead army base.

As their name suggest, the infantry Sayerets wartime mission is path finders, moving ahead of the brigade, conducting intelligence gathering and reporting back to the brigade' headquarters. The infantry Sayerets will also act as elite assault teams and will take out tactically important enemy posts, which are too well protected for the conventional battalions.

Part from the four Sayerets, which are an integral part of the infantry units, the Golany brigade has a fifth unit - Sayeret Egoz, and the T'zanhanim brigade has Sayeret Maglan and Unit YANMAM. However, there is a big difference between these three units - Sayeret Egoz is an integral part of the Golany brigade just like the other four special brigade level units. However, Sayeret Maglan and Sayeret YANMAM personnel are only attached to the T'zanhanim brigade in their first six months training. Once finished, these operators are reassigned to Sayeret Maglan and to Sayeret YANMAM, which are completely independent units. Sayeret Maglan and Sayeret YANMAM are also located in different bases then the other T'zanhanim brigade units.

In the past, the brigades also had different orientations. The T'zanhanim brigade specialized in airborne operations using helicopters and parachuting, the Golany brigade specialized in deploying the Achzarit APC and the Givaty brigade specialized in maritime operations, akin to the U.S. Marine Corps. Today, all units train with helicopters, the Givaty brigade no longer train on amphibious operations and the brigades are much closer to each other.

Among the four infantry Sayerets, Sayeret Golany is considered to be the best by far. Enjoying a very generous budget, most of it deriving from civilian donations and contributions, having a strong focus on CT, and the second most rigorous training regime after Shayetet 13, Sayeret Golany had carved itself a name of a truly elite unit.

From the mid 1990's, Sayeret NAHAL had taken a big lip forward and today is considered as equal to Sayeret T'zanhanim.

Manpower

Officially, the IDF infantry brigades are not voluntary units, which means that theoretically one can be assigned to the brigades against his will. However, due to the increasing demand for a position the infantry brigades in the last years, for most soldiers serving there it was a first choice.

There is one exception to that rule. As a historic relic from the time it was a small SF unit, the T'zanhanim brigade has a two days Selection Series (Gibush). Keeping the Gibush is actually a quite prudent move, which insures that the T'zanhanim brigade has the best manpower out of the four brigades. In the late 1990's the T'zanhanim brigade Gibush has expanded and today it screens not only for the T'zanhanim brigade but also for Sayeret Duvdevan, PALSAR 500, PALSAR 7, and Unit Oket'z.

However, all brigade level units, including the Sayeret, are volunteering units. A three-day Gibush is held at the beginning of each of the brigades' basic training phase. The infantry brigades Gibush is considered one of the hardest ones in the IDF. The best ones who passed the Gibush are selected for the Sayeret. The rest of soldiers, who successfully passed the Gibush, are spread around the other three special brigade lever units.

The Golany inner-brigade Gibush also screens for Sayeret Egoz and the T'zanhanim inner-brigade Gibush also screens for Sayeret Maglan and Unit YANMAM. As such in the Golany case, the PALSAR has the first choice of soldiers, follow by Sayeret Egoz and the other three brigade level units. In the T'zanhanim case, Sayeret Maglan choose first, then the PALSAR and Unit YANMAM and then the other three brigade level units.

Training

All of the infantry Sayerets have about the same training regime which last 20 months. Only after finishing the training regime the soldiers received their unit's insignia and shifted to combat status.

The training consists of:

Four months basic training.

Two months advanced training.

Three weeks Engagement Unit course in the IDF Counter Terror Warfare School (Unit 707) in the Mitkan Adam army base.

Two weeks parachuting course in the IDF Parachuting School in the Tel Nof AFB.

Two months intelligence gathering and mobile reconnaissance course, in the IDF Intelligence and Reconnaissance School (MOS) in the BALISH army base.

Three weeks NCO SF course in the BISLACH army base.

The rest of the training is devoted to forced marches, raids, navigations and open field combat. Several members from each team will also attend a sniper course in the IDF Snipers School the Mitkan Adam army base.

Future

In the late 1990's the IDF realized that its Infantry Corps hadn't evolve much since the creation of the IDF, and conduct some long due changes in the infantry corps. Part of these changes was also a decision to merge all four special brigade level units, which today are almost independents units, into one special battalion, akin to the U.S. Marines Corps Recon Battalions.

Another decision was to assign a fixed AO instead of the past rotation.

The future enrolment is:

Golany and NAHAL brigades along the Israeli-Lebanese border.

Givaty and T'zanhanim brigades in the Territories - the T'zanhanim brigade in the Judah and Samaria and Givaty and the Givaty brigade in the Gaza strip.

Note that these assignments reflect the IDF opinion on each of the brigades - trying to balance the deployment and placing a high quality brigade with lesser quality one.

The decisions on the infantry brigade combat deployment was postponed due to the recent Israeli-Palestinian clashes.

Special Missions Units

Sayeret Duvdevan (Unit 217)- Undercover Counter Terror unit for the Occupied Territories.

Unit Oket'z (Unit 7142) - Special Forces canine Unit.

Unit Alpinistim - Extreme weather unit.

Force 100 - Military Police Special Emergency Response Team (SERT).

Sayeret Egoz (Unit 621) - Counter Guerrilla unit.

LOTAR Eilat (Unit 7707) - Counter Terror and hostage rescue outfit, located in the city of Eilat

Special Command Teams - Special versatile task forces attached to each of the IDF three regional commands.

Sayeret Maglan (Unit 212) - Long range missiles warfare unit.

Unit Rotem - Rapid deployment and a reconnaissance outfit based at the Israeli-Egyptian border.

TIBAM Team

Provides Computer Aided Design assistance in Counter Terror and hostage rescue scenarios.

Israeli Air Force Special Forces Units

Sayeret Shaldag (Unit 5101) - the IAF premier Special Forces unit.

Airborne Rescue And Evacuation Unit (Unit 669) - the IAF Airborne Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) unit.

Unit T'ZASAM (Unit 5707) - the IAF laser designation, Bombardment Damage Assessment (BDA), and preliminary bombardment reconnaissance and intelligence gathering unit.

Airplanes Security Unit

Unit YANMAM (Unit 7298) - the Anti Aircraft (AA) corps airborne rapid deployment Special Forces unit.

Unit Egrophan (Unit 5107) - the AA corps enemy simulation unit.